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ABSTRACT

Morrison, Glenn Sean. M.S.C.S., Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
Wright State University, 2018. Threats and Mitigation of DDoS Cyberattacks Against the
U.S. Power Grid via EV Charging.

Cars are an ever changing and integral part of modern society. Two of the biggest
changes in vehicles today are their heavy integration with wireless communication and
the push toward battery powered Electric Vehicles (EV). EV and EV charging stations
have become a part of the Internet of Things (IoT). While this connectedness increases
the convenience and functionality of the vehicles and charging stations, it also opens
them up to a wide range of cyber threats.
This thesis examines the potential threats against the EV charging ecosystem
through a historical analysis of past cyberattacks and identified vulnerabilities. As EV
charging stations directly interface with the U.S. power grid, an attack initiated on EV
and charging stations is capable of jeopardize the supply-demand balance of the power
grid. If a large enough population is vulnerable to attack, then through a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) structured attack, the supply-demand balance can be exploited
to cause widespread blackouts and grid instability. Using the historical analysis of
cyberthreats, this thesis uses statistical analysis to hypothesize the feasibility of a DDoS
cyberattack against the power grid using the EV charging ecosystem as an attack vector.
We then discuss potential mitigation strategies that can help reduce the chance of
a DDoS style attack against the power grid using EVs.
iii
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Vehicle Trends
Technology has been advancing exponentially since the 1960’s. Most professionals
in the technology and computing world are familiar with Moore’s Law; the trend of
transistors on a wafer doubling every couple years. This observation became a Manifest
Destiny for the rate of progression for technology. Advancements in technology have
impacted more than just the silicon in personal computers and laptops; it is now
integrated into nearly everything humans use.
The spread of technology has forced vehicles to undergo an evolution of
functionality and identity. Just as cell phones have become devices centered around
everything but making calls, cars are no longer just a mechanical box with 4 wheels used
for transportation. Modern cars are not focused on the destination, but the journey.
Cars have become a ubiquitous part of our lives and like most things, over the
past few decades, technology has been slowly integrated into nearly every facet of cars.
Almost all new cars come standard with automatic locks, automatic windows, cruise
control, automatic braking, and sensors and warning systems for backing up and
switching lanes. The infotainment systems have been upgraded from speedometers and
odometers to include useful functions such as GPS navigation, voice control and
feedback, performance and travel analysis, wireless communication, camera and sensor
views, and a plethora of other technologies.
1

The future of today’s modern, technology rich vehicles will involve even more
technology integration. Two of the biggest trends in vehicles today are Autonomous
Vehicles, fueled by the DARPA Grand Challenge [1]; and Electric Vehicles (EV), fueled
by government regulation and the “Green Movement” [2]. This thesis will focus on EV,
vehicles that run partially or entirely off battery power instead of using conventional
fossil fuels and biofuels that most vehicles have used to date. Globally, EV sales have
been increasing steadily, with the United States, China, and European countries such as
the Netherlands showing the highest adoption rate, as seen in Figure 1. In the United
States, California accounts for a vast majority of all EV in the country as seen in Figure
2. Although the timeframes differ slightly, both figures successfully demonstrate the
overarching EV trends of today.

Figure 1.1 Global EV Trend 2010 - 2015 [3]
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Figure 1.2 US EV Trend January 2011 - August 2017 [4]

1.2 Motivation
When conducting my research, I discovered that there are two topics that are being
largely overlooked when discussing grid security and vehicle security:
1.

Attacking the power grid indirectly by manipulating the systems connected to it
and exploiting how the grid is designed to work

2.

Attacking EV and charging systems for reasons other than stealing Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) / billing information or commandeering vehicles
and the associated safety implications

3

2.1 Analysis
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss potential cyberattack models on EV and EV
charging stations and provide a statistical analysis of how they could be used as an
avenue to attack the US power grid. Cybersecurity risks in EV pose social, economic, and
political implications at the local, national, and global level. The power grid is the
backbone of the US’ critical infrastructure and much of the other critical infrastructures
such as water, natural gas, communication, transportation, sanitation, and finance all rely
on electricity to function properly.
This paper is broken into several sections.
•

Chapter 1 served as an introduction to vehicles and their entrance into the cyber
realm.

•

Chapter 2 will provide the reader with pertinent background information
regarding Cybersecurity, the US power grid, EV, EV charging, and the
connections and relationships between them.

•

Chapter 3 will discuss vulnerabilities and cyberattacks in vehicles, charging
stations, standards, and the power grid to date.

•

Chapter 4 will discuss realistic attack vectors, attack methodologies, build an
attack tree, and analyze the scope and impact of a theoretical attack.

•

Chapter 5 will discuss possible mitigation strategies to curb the feasibility of EV
being used to attack the power grid.
4

•

Chapter 6 will be a summary, conclusion, and discuss future work.
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Chapter 2. BACKGROUND RESEARCH
2.1 Cybersecurity
Cars being integrated with technology, especially technology that involves
communication, means that Cybersecurity needs to play an important role in its design
and integration. Cybersecurity is a complex discipline. It is a relatively new subject
whose scope and change of pace is far greater than nearly any other field. It is a recent
byproduct of technological breakthroughs and the interconnectedness of the Internet in
modern day society. As stated by Google’s Eric Schmidt, “The Internet is the first thing
that humanity has built that humanity doesn't understand, the largest experiment in
anarchy that we have ever had [5]”.
Over the past 40 years or so, technology and Internet has constantly changed and
evolved. Many conventional items have been modified by the Internet. Fridges, coffee
pots, lights, garage doors, thermostats, locks, surveillance cameras, and countless of
previously “dumb” systems have been integrated with wireless communication for
advanced features, convenience, and controllability. These systems have created a new
group of devices called the Internet of Things (IoT). With the addition of wireless
communication and control, cars have become an IoT device [6]. Being a part of the IoT
group means that cars attack surface increases exponentially due to its connections to
networks and other devices.
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When discussing connected and communicating devices, the terms
“cybersecurity”, “threat”, and “vulnerability” are often used. They are oftentimes
interchanged, misused, and misinterpreted. The paper Quantitative Metrics and Risk
Assessment: The Three Tenets Model of Cybersecurity by Jeff Hughes and George
Cybenko [7] discusses key terms and concepts of cybersecurity today. The main points
are briefly summarized below.
The basic characteristics that should be present in virtually any secure system:
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) [7] [8], sometimes called the CIA Triad
[9].
•

Confidentiality - Ensures that data is inaccessible, hidden, or unusable by anyone
other than the owner or intended user.

•

Integrity - Ensures that data is accurate and trustworthy and has not been modified
or tampered with.

•

Availability - Ensures that authorized parties can access their data at all times.

The basic characteristics of a Vulnerability: Susceptibility, Accessibility, and Capability
[7].
•

Confidentiality - Ensures that data is inaccessible, hidden, or unusable by anyone
other than the owner or intended user.

•

Integrity - Ensures that data is accurate and trustworthy and has not been modified
or tampered with.
7

•

Availability - Ensures that authorized parties can access their data at all times.

In order for a vulnerability to present, there must be a susceptibility that an attacker
can gain access to and has the capabilities to exploit. Figure 3 below shows the
relationship between the three characteristics.

Figure 2.1 Characteristics of a Vulnerability [7]
As with all almost all technology, standardization, regulation, and security seem
to be an afterthought and move at a much slower pace than technologies functionality
8

progression. Along with the uneven pace is the mantra of Murphy’s Law extending into
technology and cybersecurity; many experts argue that it is impossible to create a
technology system that is completely secure. Much of cybersecurity is controlled by
industry and capitalism. Instead of looking at cybersecurity from a traditional security
viewpoint, cybersecurity is becoming a risk management exercise, and systems are
designed as a sliding scale between usability, security, performance, and cost of a system.
•

Usability is a subjective metric for how well humans can use and interact with a
system.

•

Security is a complicated metric that is usually based around CIA and any
additional requirements. The required level of security is decided by the risk
management analysis for a given system and varies greatly.

•

Performance is an objective metric that is usually tied to specific requirements or
performance benchmarks. As security increases it requires additional overhead
which will impact the performance of the system.

•

Cost is an objective metric that includes both the acquisition and sustainment cost
of a total system.

Generally speaking, usability and performance are in direct contrast with security and
cost, as demonstrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 2.2 Cybersecurity Sliding Scale
Fundamentally, most entrepreneurs’ goal is to maximize profit and provide a
target level of quality, functionality, and security, with profit usually trumping all other
characteristics. In order to maximize their profit, most systems are designed with the
minimal amount of security possible. This practice will often create systems whose
security is inadequate or becomes inadequate due to changes in technology. This
approach is a major cause of a shortcomings or flaws in the CIA of a system and creates
susceptibilities.
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2.2 Electric Vehicles
2.2.1 Trend Analysis
Cars have been evolving for more than 200 years. Early models ran on steam,
electricity, and internal combustion. During the early 20th century, almost 40% of
American cars were powered by electricity. Due to the lack of electrical infrastructure,
especially for charging, along with advancements in manufacturing and the cheapness of
fossil fuels, internal combustion engine vehicles have dominated the market for a century.
Vehicles like the Model T set a precedence for the vehicle ecosystem that we have today
[10]. The internal combustion engine has shaped not only vehicles but national and global
politics and economics. Manufacturing and processing capabilities as well as critical
resource ownership has profoundly impacted the evolution of present day society [11].
Today, social, economic, and political motivations such as Global Warming and
fossil fuel dependence have created a global drive for cars, and transportation in general,
to transition to EV [12]. Over the past 20 years there have been economic and
environmental pushes promoting hybrid and pure electric vehicles, especially in states
like California, who are spearheading the development and integration of EV in the US
[13]. As of January 2018, California aims to have at least 5 million EV on the road by
2030 [14]. With roughly 25.5 million registered cars in 2017, that would mean almost
20% of the current cars would be transitioned to EV [15]. As of October 2017, California
had 337,482 pure EV [16].
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As consumer trends continue to shift (as shown in Figure 1 & 2), big companies
are responding by slowly moving to EV. Many companies are increasing their EV R&D
budgets and have given public release statements regarding 10-year to 20-year plans
aiming to move entire fleets to EV and hybrids [17]. These companies include big names
such as Ford, GM, Toyota, Mazda, Daimler (Mercedes-Benz), Nissan, Mitsubishi, Jaguar
Land Rover, Volvo, Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche, and many more [18].
2.2.2 EV Classifications
There are three general types of EV: (1) HEV - Hybrid Electric Vehicles, (2) PHEV /
EREV - Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles / Extended-Range Electric Vehicles, (3) BEV /
AEV - Battery Electric Vehicles / All Electric Vehicle [19].
1.

HEV - Powered by petroleum engine at high speeds and battery engine at
lower speeds and idle. Has rechargeable battery and petroleum fuel tank. The
battery is recharged by regenerative braking [20].

2.

PHEV / EREV - Powered by petroleum engine at high speeds and battery
engine at lower speeds and idle. Has rechargeable battery and petroleum fuel
tank. The battery is recharged by regenerative braking as well as plugging
into a charging station.

3.

BEV / AEV - Powered entirely by battery engine. Has large rechargeable
battery. Utilizes regenerative braking and charging station to charge battery.
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HEV and PHEV have a much smaller battery pack and much shorter electric engine
travel range than a BEV. However, since the HEV and PHEV have a combustion engine,
they have a far greater total travel range and are not limited by the lack of EV charging
infrastructure [20]. All three use regenerative braking, a process that utilizes the kinetic
and thermal energy lost during braking and transforms it into potential energy that is
stored back into the battery. A graphic representation can be seen below in Figure 5.

Figure 2.3 Types of Electric Vehicles

2.3 Power Grid
2.3.1 Basic Operation
The U.S. Power grid is a complex system of systems. “Local electricity grids are
interconnected to form larger networks for reliability and commercial purposes. At the
highest level, the U.S. power system in the Lower 48 states is made up of three main
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interconnections, which operate largely independently from each other with limited
transfers of electricity between them. [21]” They are divided as shown in Figure 6. The
interconnect this paper will focus on is the Western Interconnection, which includes
California.

Figure 2.4 US Power Grid Regions [21]
The power grid is comprised of several systems that work to create, regulate, and
distribute power. The main systems are [22]:
•

Power plants - coal, nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal, solar, wind, etc. In a
majority of the cases, power source is harnessed in order to power a spinning
electric generator, which is usually spun by a steam turbine.
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•

Substations - Regulate voltage from power station for transmission. Can be
categorized into two kinds, step-up and step-down, which modify the voltage for
transmission. In order to transmit power over great distances efficiently and
reduce loss, the voltage must be stepped up to much higher than used by normal
houses and businesses. Step-down substations are used to convert the voltage
down to an easily usable level for most applications. Substations are also used as
a pseudo circuit breaker for a general area it is distributing to.

•

Transmission Lines - can be seen everywhere, varying load and size. Large high
voltage lines carry load from power plant and substations great distances, several
hundred miles. Power poles and underground lines carry power from transformers
to their destination, usually not more than a few tens of miles. Can be 1, 2, or 3
phase power transmission. The main difference between the three types is the
constancy of voltage delivery and the total amount of power that is able to be
delivered in a single 360° cycle [23].

•

Transformers - Look like metal trash cans on transmission poles. Used to regulate
and maintain the voltage being sent into businesses and homes. Handles
overcurrent and undercurrent conditions. Regulates the phase of power being sent,
generally converting from 3 phase to 1 phase power.
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Figure 7, below, is copied from howstuffworks.com and gives a very simple overview
of how subcomponents of the grid are connected and interact. Real life implementations
are more complex versions of interactions described above.

Figure 2.5 Power Creation and Transmission [22]
As mentioned, the U.S. power grid is a complex system of systems. One crucial
part of that system not mentioned above are auxiliary power plants, sometimes called
peak power plants. The continuously running power plants, simply referred to as power
plants in this thesis, run 24/7, 365 days a year and make up a majority of the U.S. power
grid. Auxiliary power plants are plants that are turned on and shut off to meet the daily
16

fluctuations in demand. The demand “... typically starts going up in the morning and
peaks in the late afternoon and early evening [24].” Auxiliary power plants are generally
small and designed to turn on and off to scale for the needs of target regions during peak
hours. The size and number of auxiliary power plants for a given interconnect and subregion is based on the many factors such as the population, climate, and social/cultural
makeup of the region. Auxiliary power plants are also used to alleviate anomalies outside
of the normal peak hour spikes.
Electric demand is made up of groups of stochastic and predictable variables.
Every building, outlet, device, and person connected to the grid impact the demand.
Power companies use statistical models, historical data, contextual data, and real time
readings in order to loosely match power supply to the demand. Government regulations,
industry standards, and capitalism all drive power companies to meet or exceed the power
demand. Power consumption generally follows a rough bell curve, as shown in Figure 8
below [25]. Power consumption is at a low when the population is generally at home and
sleeping. It steadily rises during the hours of a normal work day, mostly caused by
establishments and workplaces. A large peak trend occurs in the afternoon when people
would be coming home from work. Businesses will continue to draw steady power while
residential usage such as electronics, appliances, and HVAC systems all cause this large
spike. As the day progresses and turns to night, businesses close and people sleep,
lowering the demand [26].
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Figure 2.6 - California Supply-Demand Data (28 June 2018) [25]
2.3.2 Power Grid Properties and Contingencies
Electric supply-demand is an important variable for power plants. It plays a huge
role on the economics, reliability, and quality of service being provided. The power
supplied in the US is engineered to operate at a constant 60Hz throughout the entire
system [27]. This frequency is used as a general indicator of grid health and supplydemand balance [28]. The relationship between supply-demand and frequency can be
generalized to the relationships described in Table 1 below. Grid operators focus on
frequency stability to maintain balance and protect the grid.
18

Table 2.1 Relationship Between Supply-Demand and Frequency (??)
Since it is practically infeasible to keep the frequency at a perfect 60Hz, each
Interconnect has varying levels of operational tolerances. The accepted tolerance for the
Western Interconnect is 60 Hz ± 0.036 Hz [29]. Operation is considered functional but
degraded in the range 59.50 ≤ freq ≤ 59.97. Operation is considered critical in the range if
freq < 59.50 and extreme measures will be taken to attempt to restore balance and ensure
safety of the grid. To ensure grid balance and safety, supply-demand fluctuations are
controlled by 2 basic frequency response methods: Load Balancing and Demand
Response.
Load Balancing is a supply-end approach, meaning it is deployed at the power
plants. In a nutshell, load balancing is the predictive and reactive methods of generating
power to match demand. Load balancing is used quite often in the form of powering up
peak generators daily to match the peak power spike of the afternoon. During unpredicted
and anomalous events, auxiliary generators are powered up to meet the demand [30].
The main issue with the load balancing is the timescale needed to get the
generators up to speed to match the demand. It takes an incredibly long time to power up
19

generators, in comparison to the speed it requires consumers to increase the demand.
Power generation is performed on the scale of minutes, hours, and even days. Power
consumption is performed on the scale of seconds. Below is a breakdown of the main
forms of power generation.
•

During emergency situations, Ultra Fast Gas Generators, comparable to the
turbines on airplanes, can be fired up within 5-10 minutes to react to the demand.
Due to their intrinsic design and function, they are extremely expensive,
inefficient, and produce a large amount of heat as a byproduct of power
generation. Therefore, after roughly 15 minutes, they must be shut off to prevent
damage. After being turned off, they cannot be used again until they have cooled
down, been inspected, and undergone any required maintenance. This means that
after running for a total interval of no more than 30 minutes, they require between
8-16 hours of downtime and inspection/maintenance [31].

•

Internal combustion engine generators are another relatively fast and versatile
power generation method but is relatively inefficient and expensive to use as a
main source of power. Instead, they are generally used to help start other types of
power plants start up and are used indirectly to heat steam to power steam
generators [32].
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•

Conventional fossil fuel power plants such as a coal plant can take upwards of 48hrs to reach full power production depending on the size and integration of “fast
start” mechanisms [33].

•

Nuclear plants can take between 24-72 hours to start up and reach full operation.
They are by far the most complicated and regulated power plants for startup
procedures and pre-start inspection requirements [34] [35].

•

Renewable forms of power generation are generally the most cost-effective
methods of power generation and therefore are fully utilized in normal power
generation and not used as responses to frequency events [36].

Due to the limitations of power generators, there must be faster measures in place to
help balance the grid. That is where Demand Response (DR) comes into play. Demand
response is a demand-end adaptation to grid imbalance. Essentially, DR comprised of a
host of balancing strategies that will attempt to meet or curtail the demand in order to
maintain a healthy frequency. Demand response is designed to operate on the scale of
seconds to minutes, reaching full effectiveness between 30 seconds and 1 minute, and
operating for about 15 minutes to allow a transition period for Load Balancing to kick in
[28].
The first layer of DR is the Interconnection Frequency Response Obligation
(IFRO), as mandated by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC),
the governing body for power reliability in North America. IFRO is the minimum
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capacity value that interconnects are required to have in order to handle large changes in
demand without contingencies and failsafe’s being triggered. It is essentially the
requirement for the entire interconnect region as a whole to create a certain amount of
surplus power that can be used to handle atypical, non-peak underfrequency events. The
IFRO value is different for interconnect and is reviewed and updated accordingly by the
NERC [37]. The values are summarized in Table 2 below. The importance and
implications of the Western Interconnects IFRO value will be discussed further in
Chapter 4.

Table 2.2 IFRO Minimum Requirements for Interconnects [37]
When IFRO fails to manage spikes in demand, two contingencies are in place to
help achieve balance and protect the grid: Under Frequency Load Shedding and Under
Frequency Generator Protection.
Under Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) is a protective measure that is triggered
when frequency response methods have failed to stabilize or correct a drop in frequency.
It is tightly calibrated with IFRO and designed to initiate if IFRO fails [38] It is designed
primarily as a contingency for islanded generators during a power imbalance and is
22

comprised of several stages. It will begin shedding the load from predetermined
customers in a hierarchical order. It will continue to drop service until all stages have
been iterated through. If UFLS fails, a second contingency will trigger [39].
Under Frequency Generator Protection (UFGP) is a protective measure that will
trip the generator if it is exposed to sustained low frequencies or large spikes in low
frequency. Depending on the severity and duration of the frequency imbalance, UFGP
may be triggered before UFLS has finished its shedding procedures [39]. Essentially, if
the generator begins to operate in a range that is deemed a safety hazard to the generator
or other power components it is connected to, it will be disconnected from the grid and
powered down to a safe state.
While UFLS is designed to automatically recover and restore the system to
normal operation over a period of time if balance can be achieved, triggering UFGP is
much more serious as it is designed as a final failsafe and requires human intervention
and safety protocols to be performed before the generator can be spun up and reattached
to the grid. UFGP can also cause a cascading effect on other generators in the network,
exacerbating the grid imbalance [39]. Below, Figure 9 shows the underfrequency
response relationships.
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Figure 2.7 Power System Frequency Control [40]
2.3.3 Power Grid Failure Modes
The following section provides a brief description of key failure modes associated
with power plants and the power grid. The two main modes of failure are overcurrent and
undercurrent scenarios. This thesis focuses on undercurrent induced failures. Refer back
to Table 1.
•

Overcurrent is caused by a drop in demand, causing more supply of power than is
needed. Overcurrent events are uncommon and can usually be controlled by
simply putting the excess power to ground or power storing methods. Under

24

extreme circumstances, the current will force contingencies such as circuit
breakers to trip in order to protect components [41].
•

Undercurrent is caused by a spike in demand, causing there to be not enough
power to meet the demand. The undercurrent control methods have been
explained above, including Load Balancing and DR.

Overcurrent and Undercurrent situations have the potential to cause severe impacts on
the grid, including [42]:
•

Brownout - A degraded service state where partial or complete power loss will
happen intermittently, usually caused by frequent and large oscillations in power.
This can be noticed by the dimming of light bulbs and appliances being power
cycled and reset.

•

Blackout - A complete loss of power to a given service area. Can be cause by an
emergency event or intentionally by power distributors.

•

Rolling Blackout - A complete loss of power to several service areas where the
blackout period is split among the regions, usually caused intentionally by power
distributors.

•

Cascading Failures - An event or series of events that causes the systematic
failure of a system until a steady state can be reached or total system failure has
occurred. This is considered the most severe of the failure modes of a system [43].
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2.4 EV Charging Stations
EV chargers are the “gas stations” that EV use to recharge their batteries. The
charging stations are the medium through which power created at power plants is
measured, regulated, and distributed to EV. Charging stations can be broken up into 3
tiers [44] [45]:
•

Level 1 - The charging interface is your standard home outlet, using a normal 3
prong adapter to plug into the wall. The peak power that can be drawn from most
standard residential breakers is roughly 1.5 - 2.0 KW [46], with each outlet in the
house set at a substantially smaller portion of that. Roughly speaking, it takes
somewhere between 12 - 24 hours to fully charge most EV today, providing a
Range Per Hour (RPH) charging rate of 4.5 miles/hour [44].

•

Level 2 - The charging interface will require a control box and a 240V
connection, equivalent to what many household appliances use. The peak power
of these boxes ranges greatly, from around 1-2 KW all the way to 19 KW. The
average charge rate usually associated with these chargers during discussion and
analysis is 7 KW. The charge rate that the stations are able to produce is highly
dependent on the EV being plugged in and most models cannot utilize a rate
above 7.7 KW. As a generalization, Level 2 chargers can provide up to 25 -30
RPH using 7 KW station, reducing the full charge time to just a few hours [47].
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•

Level 3 - The charging interface will require a control box and custom interface to
the power grid via a 480V DC plug. Level 3 charging is often referred to as DC
Fast Charging [45]. There are several notable physical standards for DC Fast
charging, including CHAdeMO, SAE, CCS, and Tesla Supercharger [48]. The
similarities and differences between the Level 3 chargers are irrelevant to this
thesis. What is important is they provide incredibly fast charging, being able to
provide an 80% RPH value in is as little as 30 minutes. Level 3 charging can
reach up to a 90KW peak when charging

Global industry and research interest focused on increasing the RPH rate and greatly
increasing the peak power rate, with the “European Commission’s trans-European
transport network (TEN-T)” being a driving force, aiming to create 350KW
superchargers [49]. While massive superchargers could have enormous implications on
power grid management and stability, this thesis is focusing on Level 2 chargers. Level 1
chargers pose the same level of risk that a toaster or microwave does. Today’s Level 3
superchargers are not readily available to the public, costing near $100,000 in many
cases. Level 2 chargers do not require any extensive changes to install and are relatively
cheap, with units costing several hundreds of dollars to a few thousand, making them
similar to buying an appliance like a dryer or fridge. With level 2 operating at a rate of 7
KW, they have the ability to draw the same amount of peak power that 3 - 4 residential
homes could.
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When discussing the overall operation of any level of charger, there are two main
standards. The first is ISO 15118 - Vehicle to grid communication interface [50]. The
most current version of the ISO was published in 2013. Industry has essentially taken
over standardization of EV charging with the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP),
managed by the Open Charge Alliance, “a global consortium of public and private
electric vehicle (EV) infrastructure leaders that have come together to promote open
standards [51]” for EV charging. The OCPP is separate from ISO 15118, however much
of OCPP is loosely based on ISO 15118 standards, with OCPP version 2.0 having direct
interface modules for compatibility ISO 15118 devices [52]. OCPI is another protocol
that will not be covered in this thesis, which is designed as a communication procedure
for different charging providers to communicate and share information, much like how
ATMs allow different financial institutions to use them [53].
The standard interface used by most Level 2 chargers [54] [55] is the SAE J1772
standard, which defines the socket and interface of a charging source and an EV.
Competing Level 2 standards such as Tesla [56] have begun supporting the J1772
standard. CHAdeMO and SAE CCS as well as Tesla’s interface still dominate the Level
3 charging domain, which remains largely divided [57]. The charging point and EV
communicate with each other via Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) over the J1772
interface. Requests for charging, charging rates, current rectification, and other charging
management is decided by the EV and sent to the charging station [58].
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Chapter 3. THREATSCAPE
This chapter will discuss and enumerate the threatscape for the Power Grid, EV,
and EV charging. To date, there has been no recorded attack on the power grid using EV.
However, an in-depth threat analysis will be presented in order to help explain the vast
threatscape surrounding the scenario. Analysis from this chapter will used in Chapter 4 to
discuss possible attack scenarios based off of the current threatscape. The attacks and
vulnerabilities discussed will be separated into separate groups to provide simple
delineation and categorization.

3.1 History of Power Grid Vulnerabilities
The purpose of this section is to discuss threats and vulnerabilities against the power grid.
It separated into cyber and no cyber vulnerabilities.
3.1.1 Weather and Natural Disasters
Although unrelated to cyber, the impacts and trends of nature induced scenarios
can be used in impact analysis.
Natural disasters are a constant threat to the power grid, especially its
transmission systems. Large storms, hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, and other
disasters can cause long lasting and serious impacts on power generation and
transmission. One of the most notable power disasters during my lifetime was the
Northeast blackout of 2003. A large storm paired with system contingency failures cause
most of the Midwest and parts of Canada, around 50 million people, to experience a
29

widespread blackout [59]. While most only experienced a blackout for around 2-4 days,
my housing development was in the dark for almost 6 days. It had a huge impact on my
family and community. Although the cause of the blackout isn’t relevant to this thesis, its
impact has served as a first-hand basis for how big of an impact wide scale power loss
can have. Hurricane Maria is another notable crisis, where up to 400,000 Puerto Ricans
are still without power 6 months after the disaster. Grave social, cultural, and economic
issues have stemmed from the prolonged power loss [60].
Seasonal weather patterns can also have a large impact on the grid. Historically,
during the summer months, heatwaves can put a huge strain on power plants [61] [62],
especially in states like California [63], and some have even been attributed to blackouts
[64]. This strain is primarily caused by Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
(HVAC) units. On especially warm and humid days, AC units will begin running earlier,
run for longer periods of time, and continue running past their expected daily runtime.
This spike in demand has not caused any wide scale, prolonged blackouts to date,
however the peak electricity being used has exhausted a large portion of California and
the Western Interconnects peak, auxiliary, and contingency power generation and
frequency balancing [65]. The ability to use AC units in order to perform localized
cyberattacks is something that is currently being investigated [66].
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3.1.2 Cyberattacks Against the Power Grid
Arguably the first cyberattack against critical infrastructure systems was Stuxnet,
a covert malware deployed in 2010 by the US and Israel against Iran. The malware
caused equipment in Iranian nuclear refinement facilities to become damaged, halting
their refinement efforts. The overall motivation behind it’s deployment was to prevent
war, specifically nuclear warfare from triggering between Israel and Iran [67] [68]. While
the effort can be considered a political success, many consider the event to be a Pandora’s
Box, ushering in a new age of cyberattack [68]. Below is a summary of cyberattacks
against power grids in recent history. As explained below, the frequency and severity of
the attacks is increasing. Attacks have been attributed to individuals, groups, and nation
states, with Russia being the most infamous in targeting the power grid.
3.1.2.1 Havex
Starting in 2007 and ending in 2014, a malware dubbed Havex was discovered,
targeting SCADA and Industrial Control Systems (ICS), systems in Europe. Although it
did not cause any blackouts and no damaging payloads were delivered does not mean the
attack isn’t serious. It was a “Stuxnet like” Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) that was
designed to harvest critical data from SCADA and other industrial systems [69]; data that
could be used to craft very sophisticated and specific attacks. It also provided data that
would be necessary for attackers to analyze in order to understand the systems operation,
layout, dependencies, and other situational information only known to the ICS operators.
Although mostly found mostly in Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium, Havex was also
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discovered in an isolated case in California. The malware was spread using a waterhole
technique, where victims were drawn to an array of spoofed or infected pages which used
scripts or trojan downloads to infect their targets [70].
3.1.2.2 Dragonfly
For several years leading up to 2014, A variant of the Havex malware, called
Dragonfly, is attributed to attacks across ICS and Pharmaceutical systems in Europe and
the US [71]. Like the original Havex malware, it was a APT cyberespionage tool used to
gather critical information. Aside from general improvements and adaptations to improve
functionality and infection, the main difference between Havex and Dragonfly are the
targets. It targeted Switzerland, Turkey, and the US, with a majority of the infections
occurring in the US [72].
3.1.2.3 Blackenergy
Starting in 2014, a variant of Havex and Dragonfly called Blackenergy was
discovered. Blackenergy has targeted SCADA systems across multiple ICS, focusing
power generation and transmission systems [73]. Mostly found spread across Ukraines
energy sector, Blackenergy has managed to show up across the globe. The attacks have
been attributed to Sandworm, an alleged Russian Hacking Group who has been tied to a
wide range of cyberattacks [74]. Blackenergy at its core is an APT who provides
attackers with Backdoor, Rootkit, Arbitrary Code Execution, and Botnet functionality. It
is delivered via spear phishing attacks against carefully selected individuals. A modified
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Blackenergy has also been discovered that performs additional cyberattacks such as cyber
extortion, data destruction, PII theft, and spam distribution [75].
3.1.2.4 Attack on Ukraine
Russia and Ukraine have been in an “undeclared war” since 2014 when Ukraine
and the rest of the Crimean Peninsula was forcefully annexed by Russia. Since then,
Ukraine has been under all forms of attack and repression, including cyberwarfare. This
cyberwarfare is far reaching, and according to Ukraine's Chief of Cyberpolice, occurs
every day and targets all aspects of society [76]. Some have described the attacks as “a
digital blitzkrieg”, alluding to the war strategies of the the Nazi’s during WWII [77]. One
of the most notable attacks were during During 2015 and 2016, when Russia attacked
Ukraine’s power grid several times, targeting several major power companies. These
attacks used a combination of malwares and attack techniques, including spear phishing
using Blackenergy. The attacks were able to successfully Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) and damage the software in SCADA systems, causing widespread blackouts for
prolonged periods of time [78].
3.1.2.5 Dragonfly 2.0
Beginning in 2015, a new strain of Dragonfly called Dragonfly 2.0 was
discovered. It has been tied to most of the critical infrastructure cyberattacks across the
globe over the past 3 years [79]. Like its predecessors, Dragonfly 2.0 is an improved APT
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whose strains make use of all the latest malwares, infection techniques, zero-days, and
known but unpatched exploits [80].
3.1.2.6 Attack on Ireland
The state-owned Irish power supplier EirGrid targeted by cyberespionage attacks
during mid 2017. After discovery, experts estimated that the systems had been infected a
few months prior to discovery [81]. Although little information has been released, many
experts believe that the breaches are likely caused by the Dragonfly 2.0 malware [82].
3.1.2.7 Attack on US
According to the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, the US has been
closely investigating and tracking cyberattacks against critical infrastructure since 2016
[83]. During May of 2017, the Wolf Creek nuclear power plant in Kansas was penetrated.
While no operational systems were commandeered, the extent of the network penetration
and what information was stolen remains unclear [84]. Although there was no official
attribution for the attacks, reports from security experts conclude that modified strain of
Dragonfly 2.0 was used [85].
During March of 2018, US critical infrastructure underwent a wave of
cyberattacks, impacting “electric, nuclear, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing
sectors” [86]. Security experts believe that version of Dragonfly 2.0 was also used in the
wide array of attacks which show extreme levels of sophistication and specialization [85].
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In response, the Trump Administration has publicly accused the Russian Government for
the wave of cyberattacks against US critical infrastructure [83] [86].
Although no serious damage has occurred as a result of recent cyberattacks
against the US, the malware responsible, Dragonfly 2.0 or a newer strain, is an adapted
version of the Blackenergy malware that has been used in serious attacks that caused
blackouts for extended periods of time in Ukraine. It is likely that the malware used in
recent attacks have had the ability to disrupt power but lacked the information for a
successful attack to be carried out. Originally, in 2014 the NSA briefed congress that
“China” and “one or two other countries” could have the ability to launch a cyberattack
on the US power grid [87]. China has been conducting cyberespionage with APTs for a
while now, however most of the efforts to date have been focused on R&D data,
intellectual property, and financial and trade secrets, not critical infrastructure [88]. On
the world stage, Russia appears to be at the spearhead of developing critical infrastructure
cyberattacks.
Security experts and government agencies are not the only people concerned with
cyberattacks against the grid. Lloyd’s of London, and insurance firm, put together a
financial report that discusses a plausible attack scenario and discusses implications [89].
Their research was focused on the Eastern Interconnect, which is comprised of 15
different states and Washington D.C. [90]. Based on their analysis of grid operations and
connections, Lloyd’s determined that it would only take the removal of 50 out of the 700
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power generators, roughly 7.15%, in the Eastern Interconnect in order to cause
widespread blackouts [91]. In another scenario, only 9 transformers would need to be
disabled [89]. The attacks could leave an upwards of 93 million people without power
and cost insurance companies 10’s of billions of dollars [91]. The scenario in the report is
described as a “fictionalized account based on several historical and publicly known realworld examples” [92]. While their attack scenario, termed “Erebos” does not provide any
technical instruction on how to carry out an attack, it has many of the same characteristics
as the Russian APT’s enumerated above. Their attack also is modeled to take place
during the summer due to the increased electric demand and strain that HVAC systems
put on the power grid [92].

3.2 History of Vehicle Vulnerabilities
The purpose of this section is to discuss threats and vulnerabilities associated with
non-EV and EV to date. While their propulsion systems are different, there are
similarities between their control, safety, and infotainment systems.
3.2.1 CAESS
Cybersecurity concern and analysis of cars essentially started around 2010 when
researchers at the Center for Automotive Embedded Systems Security (CAESS)
published a paper titled Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile, which
focused on finding out just how secure the electronic components in cars were [93] [94].
The results of their research indicated that nearly every aspect of cars were insecure. The
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main limitation of their research was that direct physical connection to the vehicle via the
ODB-II and other busses was required at some point to attack the system [95].
One year later in 2011, the same group from CAESS published a second paper
called Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces, which
built upon their original attack model from 2010. Instead of requiring physical connection
to the car, they were able to attack it using the mp3 player, the Bluetooth module, and
telematics unit [95] [96]. The authors concluded that cars could be hacked and exploited
remotely, however they did not provide explicit details, only a demo.
3.2.2 Miller and Valasek
The main shortcoming of the CAESS research was that they did not provide the
tools, methodologies, or attack details in their papers. DARPA became interested in
vehicle cybersecurity and in 2012, two researchers, Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek
were awarded a DARPA grant to produce a “library of tools that would aid in continuing
automotive research and reduce the barrier of entry to new researchers into the field”
[95]. The two were able to create a cyber analysis toolkit and released step by step
technical documentation demonstrating a wide array of attacks on a 2010 Ford Escape
and 2010 Toyota Prius, including taking control of the steering wheel and disabling the
brakes [97]. Although they created a toolkit and demonstrated attacks, industry
downplayed their research because they had not been able to figure out the secrets that
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CAESS had in order to remotely hack and control the car and all of their work was done
via a physical connection.
Pleased with their work, DARPA awarded the two another grants in 2013 to
continue their research and expand their tool kit to function to include simulated vehicle
systems. Even with their free introductory toolkit, vehicle security research was
incredibly cost intensive due to the need to purchase a vehicle to use as a testbed. Their
solution was to create a starter framework for Electronic Control Units (ECU), sensors,
and other standard hardware in vehicles. Instead of spending thousands of dollars on a
vehicle, researchers could spend a few hundred dollars buying sample hardware from
critical systems inside vehicles. Their research, titled “Car Hacking: For Poories” [98]
provided all of the technical data needed to get mini-testbeds up and running.
In 2014, after expanding their toolkit, they began to gather data on vehicle
architecture in an attempt to classify and group vehicles based on their expected attack
surface, design complexity, and overall security present in the communication busses.
Their analysis landed them on a 2014 Jeep Cherokee [95]. Over the next year, Miller and
Valasek were able to hack into the Jeeps WiFi unit through its hardcoded password,
which is based on the model and year of the car. After connecting to the WiFi unit via the
Sprint cellular network, they were able to discover a connection between the multimedia
system the vehicles Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. The multimedia system was not
designed to talk to the CAN bus, but the found a loophole through an ECU called the
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V850, which was designed as a listen only device that monitors the CAN bus for specific
messages. The V850 was designed to accept firmware upgrades with no authorization
requirements. Over WiFi, they were able to update the V850’s firmware and begin
sending communication to the CAN bus [99]. After establishing this connection, they
were able to send any command they desired, and therefore control the vehicle as they
saw fit [100]. The 2014 Jeep Cherokee hack remains one of the most famous and well
documented vulnerabilities discovered to this day.
3.2.3 Mathew Solnik
During 2014, another DARPA grant winner named Mathew Solnik, was also able
to demonstrate remote car hacking and control. Using the cellular network, Solnik was
able to gain remote access to a Honda Accord and manipulate its CAN bus [101]. The
attack leveraged vulnerabilities he discovered in the implementation of the client-side
GSM/CDMA protocols in the cellular unit of the car. By jamming the cellular signals, the
car was expecting such as 3G or LTE, the cellular unit would broadcast information on
earlier versions of the cellular protocol, such as 2.5G. Using these broadcasts, he was able
to abuse the protocols functionality and crack the authentication and transport security
measures. Once connected, he was able to rewrite the firmware to allow complete control
of the cellular unit [102]. The method in which Solnik gained control of the CAN bus
were not included in his Blackhat 2014 presentation.
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3.2.4 BMW
During 2014, the German Automobile Association did a research study on the
cybersecurity of BMWs. Using the cellular unit and its connection to Connected Drive,
they performed a Man in the Middle (MitM) attack that gained them access in a matter of
a few minutes. Due to the nature of the attack, the breach was undetectable. Their
research excluded any interaction with the CAN bus, although remote hacking of a
communication module is serious and plays a key role in crafting a more serious attack
[103].
3.2.5 DARPA
During February of 2015, DARPA gave a presentation on 60-Minutes showing
the remote hacking of a Chevy Impala that leveraged security flaws in General Motors
(GM) OnStar systems [104] [105]. The special showed DARPA’s Dan Kaufman
remotely controlling the Impala’s acceleration and braking. No technical details were
released during the news broadcast; however it can be reasonably assumed that any and
all of Miller, Valasek, and Solnik’s research could have been used to craft the attack.
3.2.6 Tesla
During 2015, Kevin Mahaffey and Marc Rogers presented a Tesla Model S hack
at the DEF CON hacking conference. The duo found 6 unique security flaws that allowed
them to conduct their attack [106]. Vulnerabilities included the digital car keys being
stored in an insecure tar file, plaintext passwords stored in insecure folders, and static
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WiFi security procedures that allowed easy spoofing of a trusted connection. The overall
severity of the attack was low with little CAN bus control, and the hack required physical
access in order to gain all of the necessary information [107[. Nonetheless, they worked
with Tesla and the issues were patched over the air within a week.
In 2016, researchers at Keen Security Lab were able to remotely connect several
versions of Tesla’s model S and assume full control of the cars infotainment and CAN
busses in both park and drive mode. Details of the attack were not disclosed due to the
“responsible disclosure” policies of the organization [108].
3.2.7 Hacking Community Trends
As vehicle cybersecurity have become more prevalent, so has the hacking
community. There are a wide array of tools designed to analyze, control, and distort
physical vehicles, ECUs, and CAN busses, as well as emulators and training tools [98]
[109] [101] [110]. The hacking community believes that the best way to promote security
is to remove obscurity and get as many people involved as possible. However, there is
always the possibility that these tools can be used as the foundation for more nefarious
actors.
This hacking trend can also be loosely compared to the seemingly harmless
culture “motorheads”, or car enthusiasts. There are underground communities of those
seeking to modify their vehicles control systems for top performance. Usually, their
modifications involve electronic control of the drivetrain or fuel system and removing
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governor that limits the top speed of the car. In order to perform many of these
operations, very specific information is required such as hard coded security values,
admin information, and maintenance information [111]. This community has been
hacking their cars for years, and as vehicles evolve, they likely begin to use and
contribute to the hacking and security communities that analyze EV.

3.3 History of Charging Station Vulnerabilities
There is a wide array of vulnerabilities present in charging stations. This section
will focus on covering vulnerabilities related to the remote access of charging stations
and the protocols used for remote access. Most charging stations are equipped with
wireless communication to manage charging, perform billing, and update the systems.
The communication technology includes WiFi, cellular, Bluetooth, and RFID [112]. The
addition of networking means that like EV, EV chargers can also be considered an IoT
device. Being an IoT devices means the device becomes susceptible to a wide array of
attacks [113].
3.3.1 Germany
In December of 2017, Mathias Dalheimer, a technical expert from Fraunhofer
Institute for Industrial Mathematics ITWM [114], conducted extensive research regarding
the current charging infrastructure of charging stations all over Germany [114]. The
country as a whole saw an increased average of a few hundred percent per state, with
Berlin experiencing an astonishing 3700% increase in charging infrastructure, a trend we
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will likely start seeing in large American cities [115]. He developed a custom Level 2
charger interface that allowed him to analyze and manipulate information being sent to
and from the charging station and has provided technical instructions to make your own
[116]. His research concluded that the charging stations were plagued with security
vulnerabilities.
A majority of his analysis was focused on the information share between the
phone app, the vehicle, and the charging point to the billing backend that manages the
charging. The issues touched at least 4 unique charging services including New Motion,
BMW Charge Now, E-Wald, and Ladenetz, and he suspects that many more have the
same issues. He found several issues such as:
•

Storing the UID as plaintext length 20 char (sole authentication variable), where 8
bytes are the ID token and the rest of the bytes can be set based on the service
provider.

•

Using a provably insecure cryptosystem called Mifare for transmission

•

No challenging methods in authentication of UID

He also focused on testing the security of a Hager and KEBA charging modules, both
popular and widespread across Germany. In both systems, network information regarding
the charging can be viewed on port 8080, which is HTTP, meaning it is unencrypted. All
charging activity, control messages, and requests are sent over port 8080 or 8081. By
performing a MitM attack, he was able to sniff the traffic and parse all messages, as well
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as send spoofed messages [115]. Using Shodan, a simple tool that can be used to discover
IoT devices, he was able to find the charging station as well. With the IP:Port known, he
could craft any messages he wants to the charging station, for example starting and
stopping charging [117].
The stations are also equipped with USB ports. Their purpose is for service
technicians to be able to troubleshoot and update the systems. By plugging a FAT32 USB
drive into the station, he was able to discover everything about the charging station,
including the firmware version, ifconfig data, and admin username and password, which
were factory defaults. Security flaws included [115] [116] [118]:
•

The only requirement for overwriting the system configuration was to name the
new configuration file the same name and replace it. Update process requires no
authentication

•

The same update process could be initiated via HTTP. Just initiate a Telnet
connection and launch the shell

•

All processes run by the system had root privileges

•

Updated configuration files can be used to enable arbitrary code execution, using
string concatenation was able to run custom scripts (buffer overflow). In this case
he just ran an 8-bit display with messages such as “pwnd” and “charge free
today”, but much more serious actions can be performed on power control and
charging systems including simulating artificial charging events.
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A new charging feature called Autocharge can initiate charging events using only the
MAC address of the car as an authentication token. While MAC address space iteration
suffers from computational infeasibility issues, the MAC addresses are auto generated at
the factory that the NIC is created and therefore the make, model, and year of the car can
be used to narrow down the address space. Using Spoofed MAC addresses is currently
only a concern for energy theft, since a physical device is required to initiate charging
[116].
In his closing remarks, he described the current charging infrastructure as a “loose
collection of technologies”. Due to the current architectures of the charging stations and
EV, drastic changes to improve the security of the charging process are not likely. He
made references to solutions such as standing up PKI infrastructure, which could not be
supported by the current ARM based systems used in the charging process. Certified
smart meter gateways, which would be standalone modules that maintain regulation and
security of electric transfer, would need integrated into the charge points, and would be
incredibly costly to certify, integrate, and maintain [116].
3.3.2 Hack in the Box
Ofer Shezaf, founder of OWASP Israel presented charging station hacking
methodologies at Hack in the Box. His main findings determined that charging stations
had several vulnerabilities that would normally be protected by even the simplest of
administrators in a traditional networking setting [119].
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Like most researchers, he found that the security of RFID billing procedures were
missing. Most of the information was sent in the clear and easily captured via MitM
attacks. Some stations were protected by symmetric encryption. After further
examination, he discovered that the symmetric key was the same for all stations of the
same type, meaning that once you extracted it via physical interactions with the station,
you could then perform a MitM attack on the encrypted traffic [120]. He also found that
the WiFi wireless communications were HTTP and could be subject to MitM attacks as
well as Injection attacks [120]. He concluded that weaknesses in wireless communication
allowed for DoS and data theft cyberattacks.

3.4 History of Protocol Vulnerabilities
The protocol vulnerabilities covered in this section are focused on OCPP. The
charging station ecosystem is comprised of mostly OCPP based systems. Big issue and
reason why OCPP rules the charging protocol battle is because ISO standards are
expensive to obtain and OCPP is open source. This costliness of ISO standards is also
reflected in my ability to find sources. A majority of the vulnerability analysis I found is
focused on diagnosing and treating OCPP vulnerabilities. The version of OCPP found in
nearly all charging stations today is OCPP v1.5, which was released in 2012. A newer
version, OCPP 2.0 was released during April of 2018, and is not included in the scope of
this assessment [121]. From this point, the phrase ‘OCPP’ implies OCP v1.5.
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3.4.1 OCPP
The OCPP protocol is designed to coordinate communication between a charging
point, power manager, and EV. The main focus of the protocol is to provide a clear
method for charging to be metered and controlled and a majority of its structure is
comprised of communication between the charge point and power manager. OCPP is
“mainly concerned with reservations and management of charging processes with
restricted security considerations, principally limited to ensuring that charging is
performed only when authorized by a billing system” [122]. OCPP communication
utilizes Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), an Extensible Markup Language (XML)
extension over HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) via Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). All communication and data requests within the protocol
are performed using the SOAP framework which facilitates the sending and receiving
functions in human friendly plaintext [123]. The protocol recommends that securing
critical information by implementing Transport Layer Security (TLS) or WebSockets
(WS) where needed but does not explicitly implement it within OCPP [122].
As described previously in vulnerabilities found in charging stations, sending
messages via HTTP means that data is vulnerable to packet sniffing. This packet sniffing
allows for MitM type attacks including [122] [124] [125] [126]:
1.

Eavesdropping

2.

Packet spoofing, sinkhole attacks, and session hijacking
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3.

DoS, both communication and charging

4.

Financial impersonation and energy theft

5.

Impact charging station power stability

Sending messages via HTTP is the most common communication method. As a
solution, charging station developers can implement low level security implementations
such as TLS. This encryption only provides the illusion of security. If an attacker is
performing reconnaissance on the network traffic around the charging station, they will
see the initial bootstrapping and node commissioning messages sent via HTTP. In a race
condition, the attacker can send a spoofed packet using the obtained public key and nonce
value to establish a secured connection with the charging station [122].
TLS does not provide end-to-end security since the attempt at a secure tunnel
described above would only be between the charging point and the initial interface of the
billing back end. Any intermediate points in the billing back end is only required to use
HTTP, therefore there is no way to guarantee the integrity of the response [125].
Using the RFID UID as the sole token of authentication in the billing scheme with
weak challenging allows for credential theft in the form of [125]:
1.

Eavesdropping

2.

Brute force
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Encapsulating existing and familiar protocols into OCPP helps provide familiarity
and robustness in its use and implementation [123]. However, utilizing existing protocols
means that the encapsulated protocol runs the risk of inheriting vulnerabilities from the
underlying protocols. For example, after exploiting the insecure nature of HTTP,
attackers could perform XML Injection, potentially altering the intended logic of the
protocol and allow for code injection. The TCP/IP protocol itself is also vulnerable to
TCP RST and SYN flood attacks [122]. It is also worth mentioning that Injection attacks
rank #1 on the list of top security risks of 2017 [127].
3.4.2 SAE J1772
During my research, I found no documentation describing vulnerabilities or
exploits of the J1772 connection between EV and charging stations. The interface is a
physical link, with low level communication link, and does not directly impact decision
making or power management.

3.5 History of Application Vulnerabilities
A common trend becoming available to most vehicles is increased convenience
and control through the use of phone applications. Used to control location data,
lock/unlock, and starting ignition. Most charging stations are also equipped with phone
apps. The following section will discuss recent vulnerabilities discovered in vehicle
related phone apps.
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3.5.1 Tesla
In 2014, Nitesh Dhanjani found two vulnerabilities in Teslas phone app. The app
can perform a wide array of features including monitoring the location, starting and
stopping the car, controlling charging, controlling the headlights, locking and unlocking
the doors, and even control the sunroof [128].
The first vulnerability was the password system. The Tesla app is secured with a
6-digit password and the app did not force a lockout due to multiple failed login attempts.
This allowed for easy brute forcing [129]. The most challenging part of hacking into the
app was knowing the attacker’s login email. Obtaining an owners email could be
accomplished relatively easily using spear phishing attacks or other forms of social
engineering [130].
The second vulnerability was Tesla’s REST API. Tesla users email, and password
are stored in a cleartext data token in the apps directory. Although it was not Tesla’s
intention, 3rd party app makers started to create Tesla apps that invoked parts of the Tesla
REST API. Essentially, app makers could create apps that were able to make a get() API
call that would retrieve the owners login information. Once this information was
retrieved, it could be redirected to the 3rd party apps folder, stealing the password and
allowing them to do whatever they want with it [129].
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3.5.2 Nissan
In 2016, vulnerabilities in the Nissan Leaf’s companion phone app were
discovered. The vulnerability was centered around the phone apps implementation and
some social engineering paired with brute forcing. The major issue with the app was that
it did not use any form of authorization to validate requests. The only thing required for
the app to function was the cars VIN number, which is stenciled into most car’s
windshield dashboard [131]. Aside from walking up to the car and copying the number,
brute forcing the VIN number would not be too hard. Most of the VIN number digits can
be assumed based on the cars make, model, year, and country of origin [132]. This could
reasonably narrow down the guess space to 5 digits. After further research, it was also
determined that commands could be sent from a web browser, making brute force all the
more feasible. The attack could not be carried out while the car is moving, however.
3.5.3 Hyundai
In 2017, a vulnerability in the Hyundai Blue Link phone app was discovered that
allowed attackers to locate, unlock, remote start, and steal vehicles. The technical details
of the attack were not released, however the research firm who found the vulnerability
said the exploit was made possible by a bug implemented in one of the app updates. The
bug could allow attackers to steal the owners account information from user WiFi
transmissions and use the legitimate app functionality to steal the car [133].
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3.5.4 Android
In September of 2017, Kaspersky reviewed “nine mobile apps from the largest car
manufacturers” [134]. Their analysis focused on analyzing app security against the 3
largest security threats that malicious Android apps have historically used: malicious
rooting, malicious overlay, and malicious code injection. Their analysis found that 0 of
the 9 apps protected against any of the 3 forms of malware. Using malicious rooting, the
security researchers at Promon were able to create a nefarious version of the Tesla app
that would steal the owner’s username and password. The app would broadcast the
information to attackers, and they even stood up a fake Tesla server which allowed them
to initiate the keyless driving function, allowing the car to be stolen [135].
3.5.5 Charging Station Considerations
I was unable to find any documentation regarding vulnerabilities in charging
station phone apps. One thing to consider is indirect exploitation through charging apps
dependencies. A star example is ChargePoint’s companion app, which provides a wide
array of charging control features. In order to increase the capabilities and convenience of
the app, they have integrated it with 3rd party services like Nest and Alexa [136]. Adding
trusted functionality for 3rd party apps could be a potential susceptibility for the
companion app.
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3.6 History of IoT Vulnerabilities
Because EV and EV charging stations are now a part of the IoT category, this
section will provide a brief overview of a few IoT vulnerabilities.
3.6.1 DEF CON
The IoT Village at DEF CON held an IoT hacking competition. The results of the
competition found 47 IoT vulnerabilities across 27 unique devices. The vulnerabilities
affected a wide range of devices, including door locks, thermostats, refrigerators,
wheelchairs, WiFi range extenders, routers, and even solar panel arrays. Vulnerabilities
included insecure and hardcoded passwords, buffer overflows, command injection,
password sniffing, replay attacks, and cross site request forgery. To date, the IoT Village
efforts have discovered 113 total IoT vulnerabilities over the past few years [137].
3.6.2 Dyn DDoS Attack
During October of 2016, Dyn, one of the world's largest Domain Name Server
(DNS) providers, fell victim to one of the largest DDoS attacks ever recorded. The attack
was able to bring down many big-name domains such as Twitter, Amazon, Netflix,
Reddit, CNN, BBC, Paypal, and Github [138]. DNS is a critical component in the
Internet's infrastructure, managing the relationship between human friendly domains such
as www.google.com and its respective IP address.
The attack was carried out by the Mirai Botnet [139]. Using a worm to spread
itself across the Internet, it targeted IoT devices. The worm exploited a wide variety of
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poor security implementations ranging from poor design, hard coded passwords, factory
default passwords, hidden admin access points, and even some which had no
authentication process. Once the worm gained access to the device, it deployed the botnet
code into the RAM of the device, which would take control of the device. Once fully
infected, the new IoT bot would notify the C&C server and scan the Internet for a new
device to infect [140]. A key to Mirai’s success was that it did not remove the IoT
devices functionality, so the DVRs, IP cameras, thermostats, baby monitors, routers, and
other IoT devices continued to work as intended. This was important because the
malware was running from RAM; if a user cycled the power on the device in an attempt
to fix it, Mirai would be removed from the device [141].
Mirai was used to perform thousands of attacks over a few months. Several
attacks were record breaking, with the attack on Dyn being the largest and most
impactful, with its effects being felt globally. The attack on Dyn spanned a period of
about 8 hours, was deployed in 2 phases, and is estimated to have used roughly 100,000
compromised IoT devices [142]. The second phase of the attack, dubbed a “water
torture” attack, indirectly attacked the domains by targeting the operation of DNS itself.
The attack focused on overwhelming the targeted domains authoritative DNS server,
sending a loop of recursive queries [143].
The attack on Dyn was the first of its kind in both complexity and magnitude. The
root cause of the attack was the poor security and management of IoT devices. Today,

54

many of the security issues found in Mirai are still ranked at #1 for the OWASP
vulnerability chart [144]. IoT botnets are a huge problem today and will continue to be a
problem until manufactures and users start taking serious measures to secure their
devices.
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Chapter 4. REALISTIC ATTACK SCENARIO
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss a realistic attack scenario based on the
historical analysis of vulnerabilities and attacks mentioned in Chapter 3. The complexity
of the relationship between EV, EV chargers, charge managers, the Internet, phone
applications, and the power grid makes crafting cyberattacks a nontrivial task. Creating a
successful attack will likely require an incredibly complex attack path that makes use of
several vulnerabilities across several components in the charging path. Figure 10 is a
graphical representation of the interconnectedness of the charging process. An important
trend to notice is that all parts of the system are directly or indirectly connected to the
Internet.

Figure 4.1 Relationship Between Components
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The current ecosystem of home chargers do not include a billing backend tied to a
charging manager. This further reduces the attack scope and attack constraints of the
possible scenarios. Without the billing backend, there are less connections to the power
grid and charging stations. However, this is favorable for an attacker because it further
reduces the authentication and management of the charging process.
The only requirements for standing up a Level 2 charger in your home is a
dedicated 240V circuit in your home breaker and compliance with US Fire Code and
other safety regulations regarding the stations placement and installation [145]. At most,
electrical contractors may need to expand the current electrical infrastructure of your
house if your breaker cannot support a dedicated 240V circuit, however this is rare since
many common home appliances such as stoves and washers/dryers use the same circuit.
Once installed, home chargers generally need to be connected to the Internet in
order for them to provide their full range of services; the popular ChargePoint home
station is a good example. After connecting to the home breaker, the charging station
needs to be configured. Using their phone app, you are required to create an account and
provide your personal information. Then, using your phone, you find your home charger
and connect it to WiFi. Once connected to the network, the station can be controlled
remotely. It can be configured to to auto charge, by time, by price, or be manually
controlled using the phone or web app [146]. Other brands, such as EV Box [147], Blink
[148], and Tesla [149], use similar methods of setting up and managing home chargers.
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The ability to control charging over the Internet without the need to talk to the billing
backend [150] gives attackers more freedom to conduct their attacks, as described in the
section below.

4.1 Attack Goals and Possible Attack Paths
The DDoS cyberattack against Dyn was described in Chapter 3. Using a botnet of IoT
devices, the attackers were able to indirectly attack domains by attacking the fundamental
functionality of the DNS service upon which they relied. The goal of the following attack
scenario is to discuss a similar attack: DDoS cyberattack against the US power grid
indirectly by creating a botnet that can manipulate the supply-demand balance of the grid.
In order to be able to manipulate the supply-demand of the grid, attackers must be able to
remotely control the charging behaviors of charging stations in a scalable manner. This
can be done by:
•

Directly controlling the charging station via the Internet

•

Indirectly controlling the charging station via phone applications
o Directly controlling the charging station via vehicle companion app
o Indirectly controlling the charging station via charging applications

4.1.1 Directly via Internet
Threat scenarios discussed in Chapter 3 regarding current charging stations and OCPP
showed a wide range of vulnerabilities. This attack focuses on directly communicating
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with the charging station. Charging stations are vulnerable to [115] [116] [118] [122]
[124] [125] [126]:
1. Eavesdropping and credential theft
2. Packet Spoofing and other MitM based attacks
3. Sinkhole attacks
4. Unchallenged/unauthenticated remote firmware updates
5. Remote arbitrary code execution via Injection and Buffer Overflows
6. Remote control of charging events
7. Remote simulation of charging events
8. Defeat TLS via race conditions
The charging station is connected to the Internet so that it can receive updates and
management remotely. The Internet can be used to remotely update the firmware and
remotely manage the device providing functions such as restarting the system or starting
and stopping charging events. Using the remote firmware update process, an attacker
could install a malicious update that modifies the firmware to accept commands [123].
Updating the firmware would allow for injection of additional functionality to the
attacker, such as methods for maintaining communication with the C&C Server.
To start an update, all you need to do is send the charging station an
UpdateFirmwareRequest.req() message. The message only includes the URL where the
update can be downloaded and control variables such as date and time. During the
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update, the managing party can send FirmwareStatusNotification.req() to monitor the
update progress. The final FirmwareStatusNotification.conf() message will notify the
managing party that the update is complete. During a normal operation, the managing
party is the vendor that creates the charging station. However, if an attacker is able to
identify the IP address of the charging station, they will be able to craft their own
malicious update request. Since no authentication is required to initiate a firmware
update, it will automatically attempt to update after the date and time in the message
[151]. The Web Service Description Language (WSDL) for the functions can be seen in
Figure 11.

Figure 4.2 Firmware Update WSDL [152]
The attacker can control the charging behavior using
RemoteStartTransaction.req() and RemoteStopTransaction.req().
RemoteStartTransaction.req() requires a unique charging ID and the ID of the charging
connector being used [151], as shown in the WSDL of Figure 12 [152]. When used by a
public charge point, the unique charging ID is sent to the billing backend for verification.
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However, at home charging stations, there is no billing backend so the devices are set to
default accept whatever the charging ID is. The only thing that the attacker needs to get
right is the device ID and charging port ID. By performing eavesdropping, the attacker
can determine necessary information to craft spoofed charging request packets. The
attacker also could have modified the firmware to accept specialized control packets that
can be used to control charging events.

Figure 4.3 Charging Event WSDL
4.1.2 Indirectly via Phone Application
Companion phone apps for charging stations and electric vehicles are an
incredibly common feature today. While phone apps add convenience, they also add
another layer of vulnerabilities. Specifically, the Android platform has a long history of
vulnerabilities and exploits. A study by Kaspersky [134] determined that of the “top” 9
vehicle apps, none of them provided protection against the 3 most common Android
attacks:
1. Malicious rooted apps
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2. Malicious overlays
3. Malicious Code Injection
Researches at Promon were able to demonstrate that, using existing malicious
rooted apps, they could easily replace the Tesla app on a persons phone and enable total
control of the car and steal their login credentials [135]. Although there are no reported
cases of charging station credential or vehicle credential thefts reported in the wild, that
does not mean its not a threat. In 2017, Google took down 700,000 malicious apps from
the Google Play Store [153]. That still didn’t stop roughly 50 malicious apps from
slipping through, which resulted in millions of downloads [154]. Malicious apps that can
steal credentials or subvert apps will also commonly sell their abilities to the highest
bidder. After the app is established, they will transfer it to a new entity that will use the
malware for whatever they want.
If a phone can be compromised, an attacker could attempt to remotely control the
charging through either the vehicle or through the station itself. The charging can be
controlled by EVs in a scenario where charging is configured to auto charge; the charging
station will begin charging once plugged into an EV with no charging credentials
required [155]. If the attacker can control the vehicles charging behavior, they can start
and stop charging regardless of the charging station. This situation is less likely as EV
owners will likely try to obtain premium rates for charging by scheduling it for non-peak
hours such as late at night.

62

The second and more powerful attack would be gaining control of the charging
stations phone app. Using stolen credentials or a subverted app, the attacker could
directly control charging events. Stolen credentials can be used to log into the charging
stations web application and send charging commands. Using network analysis tools, the
attacker could figure out how the web application sends the commands and use the stolen
credentials to create a script that will automate the commands to all the stolen accounts.
Using a subverted app, the attacker could add additional functionality that silently listens
to a C&C server for instructions on when to launch the attack.

4.2 Attack Feasibility
The attacker is not constrained to one attack path. Using all 3 attack methods will
give the attacker the highest chance of success. Diversity of charging stations will not
help as many versions of stations have been found to be incredibly insecure. As realized
in the Dyn attack, there are a large number of device owners that do not go through the
proper measures to secure their IoT devices. Using a tool such as the Shodan command
line library [156] allows for easy searching for vulnerable charging stations. Tools such
as wireshark [157] can be used to monitor the traffic at vulnerable IPs and libraries like
pcap [158] or netwox [159] can be used to send attack packets. The authors of Mirai
posted its source code publicly available online [160], giving attackers pointers on how a
similar attack structure could be designed.
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The C&C server should be managed and operated outside of the zone that is being
attacked to ensure that the connection persists. As power is restored to areas, charging
stations will come back online and can be directed to begin charging again, exacerbating
the power recovery efforts.
The attacker could use other situational variables to enhance their chance of
success. If they chose to perform the attack during a heatwave in the summer, HVAC
units would be putting extra strain on the power grid. This could be used to help ensure
that the spike exhausts the resources the power grid has available, since a majority of
their peak generation capabilities will already be used to handle the peak caused by
HVAC units.
The attacker should also conduct the attack during peak hours of the day, when
people are using the most energy and EVs are likely to be home and connected to their
chargers. During peak hours, EV charging trends follow a general pattern, where a small
percentage of users will charge during peak hours, while most of the charging occurs in
intervals over the night during non-peak hours [161]. Using multiple attack vectors and
exploiting environmental and consumer trends, an attacker could create an attack scenario
that allows for the compromise and control of a large amount of unsupervised consumer
home charging stations.
The attack scenario mentioned above is reasonable because current research has
done modeling and analysis of a similar problem. As mentioned in Chapter 3 [61] [64]
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[66], AC units have historically been a non-cyber threat to the stability of the power grid.
Further research has also been performed regarding the cybersecurity of “smart” AC
units, connected to either the Internet or an Internet controlled smart meter. In their
analysis, they determined that vulnerabilities in the operation of the smart AC units
allowed for a DDoS attack against the local power grid [28]. Other research efforts have
concluded that EV charging is the next vector destabilizing the power grid both through
non-cyber and cyberattack vectors [162] [163].
The research from [28] based their analysis on the ability for smart AC units to
cause sustained underfrequency to the power grid. Their work compared the frequency of
the grid to the amount of load required to cause an underfrequency event. “The
relationship between the impact (Hz) and the required load (MW) can be used to evaluate
the resilience of the smart grid to cyber-physical attacks based on the acceptable level of
impact imposed on the power system [28]”.
Using the power grid research from Chapter 2, this thesis will use the same
relationship from [28] to determine the required scale of EV Level 2 chargers needed to
impact the Western Interconnect, based on California population statistics alone. This is
reasonable because of the analysis provided in Chapter 1; California makes up a large
majority of total US EV ownership at nearly 58% [4].

65

4.3 Statistical Analysis
Using the statistics from Chapter 2 [14] [27] [30] [37] [38] [39], the following
general formula in Figure 13 is a derivative of [28] study that describes the relationship
between IFRO, frequency variation, charge rate, and the total number of EV:

Figure 4.4 DoS Threshold Formula
The power grid is designed to handle gradual fluctuations in demand. The main
goal of the DDoS attack is to cause a large, instantaneous spike in demand. This spike
will trigger frequency responses. IFRO will be the immediate response, reaching its full
potential within 10s of seconds. If the spike exceeds the IFRO value, then UFLS will
initiate, providing reduced QoS and dropping service to customers in a hierarchical
fashion. If UFLS or the frequency variation is too great, UFGP will initiate. UFGP will
begin to island power generators from the grid in order to protect the turbines. Initiating
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UFGP will incur noticeable penalties to QoS with the likelihood of blackouts being very
likely. After tens of minutes, the quick and expensive supply producing methods such as
gas turbine generators will be forced to shut off and be out of commission for extended
periods of time. Loss of the quick response generators will cause the frequency to drop
even more, and the likelihood of widespread UFGP and generator islanding is very likely.
If the EV chargers are able to cause a sustained, large spike in demand then the
EV can be used to cause a supply-demand imbalance that will cause the cascading
disconnection of power supply from the power grid. The power plants would be forced
into restart conditions, which range anywhere from 4 hours to 72 hours depending on the
type. These disconnections would cause widespread blackouts across immediate local
areas. The impacts would be felt across the Western Interconnect. As portions of it fail,
the entire region would enter a state of imbalance, and the potential for further service
disruption is likely.
Using this formula, the goal is to determine the total number of infected EVs
required to trigger UFLS and UFGP contingencies. This is analyzed using both the
required and perfect case IFRO values for the Western Interconnected evaluated by
NERC for 2017. The following table provides a summary of the variables and results, as
well as the percentage of the 5 million EV goal for California.
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Table 4.1 Infection Results
The results from this table do not include any outside factors such as time of day
or season, which could both be used in the attackers favor when launching an attack. The
minimum infection rate required to induce localized DDoS is 12.0%. The minimum
infection rate required to induce generator islanding and widespread blackouts is 21.6%.
The most popular charging networks in the US are ChargePoint, Tesla, and the Blink
network, making up roughly 66% of the nation’s charging infrastructure [164].
ChargePoint accounts for 39.3% of the chargers. This means that theoretically, an
attacker would only need to be able to compromise a little more than half of all the
ChargePoint chargers in order to launch an attack.

4.4 Impact
The impact of a DDoS attack against the US power grid would be serious. Loss of
power would have an immediate impact on other critical infrastructure such as water,
natural gas, communication, transportation, sanitation, and finance. Many people’s homes
would be without the resources they rely on. Hospitals, fire stations, police departments,
and other important services would be without power and operating at reduced levels.
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Many of these services have forms of backup power, but depending on the duration of the
blackout, lives could be at risk.
I learned firsthand during the 2003 blackout that local supplies become scarce
during a blackout. Those without backup power lost the contents of the fridges and
freezers during the first the first 24 - 48 hours. Local gas stations and supermarkets were
completely sold out of ice and coolers within the first 8 hours. Flashlights, batteries,
bottled water, and nonperishables were wiped from the shelves. The only way to pay for
anything was with physical currency, which was an issue because my family rarely
carried cash.
When blackouts are caused by natural disasters, it causes people to react
irrationally out of fear or desperation. Looting and crime are at a high in situations such
as hurricanes when blackouts happen for long periods of time. People will hoard
resources in an attempt to ensure that they do not run out.
In the past, blackouts have been tied to nature and therefore, the earth is at fault
for the impact on people. A cyberattack is different. It would likely cause intense political
pressure. People could possibly begin to doubt the government if it is unable to protect
people's critical resources from human based attacks. If attribution can be made, there
will probably be intense feelings of anger and retribution, similar to those that happened
during the terrorist attacks on 9/11. In the event that an attack is tied back to a nation
state, a new political precedence will need to be formed. Is a cyberattack an act of war?
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Will military action be used in reaction to a cyberattack? How would the US look if it
does not react with strong measures after being attacked [89]? An attack of this nature
would have serious impacts on politics and foreign policy.
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Chapter 5. MITIGATION
There are several ways that the threat of a cyberattack against the grid can be mitigated.
The two strategies of increasing grid security are through:
1. Charging Infrastructure
2. Power Grid

5.1 Power Grid
5.1.1 OCPP
Arguably the most important solution will be to implement OCPP v2.0 and all of
its optional security functionality [165]. OCPP v2.0 has added the implementation of
security profiles, allowing owners to configure the security of their device, including key
management, certificate management, and the use of HTTPS. It has also added the ability
to integrate the charging stations into smart grid topologies and allow for remote station
management outside of the current billing focused management. The architecture of
OCPP v2.0 is also designed to fully compatible with ISO 15118, allowing for better
portability and functionality [166].
OCPP v2.0 adds multiple security features, but its integration will not that easy.
Vendors and the billing backend will need to modify and update their systems to handle
the increased requirements. Some stations may also require hardware updates in order to
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meet the additional overhead required to interface with smart grid technology and
certificate/key management [167].
5.1.2 Intelligent Design with Security in Mind
Charging station designers should also focus on total security of the system, not
just the protection of billing information. Current security is based around a charging
account and verification performed by the billing backend. Administration and
maintenance should use functionalities within the security profiles to ensure things such
as signed firmware updates and encryption and signatures be used on charging control
messages and not just billing messages. Data stored on the charging stations, such as
signatures and keys, should also be encrypted and obfuscated to further increase the
difficulty required to obtain information. Also, critical security data such as keys should
not be hardcoded or derivatives of a reasonably guessable pattern by using data such as
vendor, model, or year of production [168].

5.2 Power Grid
5.2.1 Smart Grid
Some Argue that integration of smart grid technology will be better suited to
handle undesirable behavior and attacks against charging infrastructure. Smart grid
technology allows operators greater visibility and control of the supply-demand balance
[169]. The two main drawbacks are scope and level of complexity. Power grid operation
will need to have the ability to take the massive amount of constantly changing data and
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use it to make calculated decisions. The behavioral modeling and contingency
management will be incredibly hard to perfect. The addition of smart grid technology will
also increase the attack surface on which the grid can be manipulated and attacked.
Greater control will also create greater chance of attack [170].
Smart grid integration also need to ensure that manual controls and overrides
remain in the grid. Operators ability to manually control the grid is an important
functionality that is commonly used in emergency events. There is a noticeable trend of
reduced human controllable inputs in newer smart grid technology that is being proposed
and trialed [89].
5.2.2 Smart Charging Algorithm
Smart charging algorithms added to charging stations can be used to more
efficiently and economically charge EVs. In a paper published by WSU’s SMART Lab,
they were able to prove that a smart charging algorithm can be used to mitigate
undesirable behavior in charging patterns to more efficiently manage the load by treating
EV as peak demand home appliances [171]. The algorithm uses deep learning to
efficiently schedule the users charging behavior in relation to the current demand on the
power grid and from learned predictions based on the users charging habits. This
algorithm could also be modified to manage individual charging stations to quickly react
to large spikes in charging demand.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
6.1 Conclusion
Cars are an ever changing and integral part of modern society. Technology has
been slowly integrated into nearly every facet of cars. Almost all new cars come standard
with automatic locks, automatic windows, cruise control, automatic braking, and sensors
and warning systems for backing up and switching lanes. The most notable technological
advances in cars are the integration of wireless communication, the use of phone
applications to control cars, and the push towards EV replacing fossil fuel internal
combustion engine vehicles. Wireless communication in EV and charging stations has
turned them into IoT devices, bringing all of the convenience and attack vectors that the
Internet provides. EV will replace HVAC and become the next generation of residential
appliance that can put large strains on the power grid.
This thesis discusses the functionality and relationship between EV, EV charging
stations, the power grid, and the Internet. A historical analysis of cyber vulnerabilities
that impact the power grid, cars, charging stations, vehicle phone apps, cell phones, and
IoT devices was presented. Using past attacks, this thesis discussed a theoretical
cyberattack that is closely related to the Mirai botnet that was used to DDoS Dyn in 2016.
Using vulnerabilities in charging station wireless communication and smartphone
applications, an attacker could create a botnet of charging stations and cellular devices
that can be used to launch an indirect cyberattack against the U.S. power grid by causing
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extreme fluctuation in the supply-demand balance, using the functionality of the power
grids contingency measures against it.
Using statistical analysis, this malicious spike in demand will need to exceed the
IFRO value and be large enough to cause a 0.9Hz underfrequency event. This will cause
UFLS and UFGP to be initiated and wide scale DoS to consumers. The analysis is based
off of metrics for 2017 NERC values for the Western Interconnect and California’s 2030
goal to have 5 million registered EV. Using these numbers, it will only require control of
roughly 21.6% of California’s EV population to launch an attack that could cause wide
scale blackouts.

6.2 Future Work
There are several possibilities for future work based off of the preliminary
research performed in this thesis. These topics include:
1.

The Smart Grid

2.

Implementation of OCPP 2.0

3.

Home use of Super Chargers

4.

Use of wireless charging mediums

5.

Overfrequency based attack (power dumping)

6.

Public charging station based attack

7.

Geographical locations outside of Western Interconnect
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